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Summary
This paper examines the connection between globalisation, with its growth in world 
trade links, and certain ecological effects especially concerning “North-South” relations. 
Although world trade in the mid-nineties was signifi cantly uncoupled from growth trends 
in the world economy, so that since then it has increased nearly three times faster than 
the global GDP, certain indicators of energy use and CO
2
 emissions have not developed 
proportionately to world trade; globalisation evidently does not lead to a situation where 
pressures on the environment are increasing to the same extent worldwide. This de-link-
ing may, however, result in the kind of shifts that we examine here with reference to the 
material trade fl ows of the European Union. It will be shown that, in the course of glo-
balisation, the countries of the EU have increasingly shifted environmental burdens on 
to the countries of the South, especially in the form of ecological rucksacks of imported 
raw materials, while at the same time reducing the pressure on their own domestic envi-
ronment by extracting fewer material resources. Furthermore, goods whose production 
places intensive pressure on the environment (industrial emissions into the atmosphere 
and water, heavy metal emissions, etc.) have been increasingly imported from newly 
industrializing or developing countries. The greater covering of material requirements 
from foreign resources has served not so much the EUʼs internal consumption as its own 
production of export goods; this shows that the EU has an increasing share in the resource 
requirement of other economies. The paper concludes that it is absolutely necessary to 
consider the international dimension in any strategy for more productive use of resources 
in industrial countries. In the long term, the EUʼs resource use should also be reduced in 
absolute terms. This will also be necessary in order to reduce the pressure on the environ-
ment due to imports and exports.
The authors are grateful to Raimund Bleischwitz for helpful comments on this paper. 
We also thank Angelika Zahrnt, Margareta Kulessa, Jill Jäger, Reinhard Loske and Peter 
Hennicke for helpful comments on an earlier draft, as well as Wolfgang Sachs for help-
ful suggestions and comments during the development of this paper. We thank Sabine 
Schneider for her valuable help in the acquisition and preparation of the data, as well as 
for technical assistance in preparing the paper for publication for which we are further 
grateful to Bing Fu.
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1 Introduction
This Wuppertal paper, which is part of the “What Kind of Globalisation Is Sustainable?” 
project, presents the results of the “Global Material Flows” working group. The analy-
sis centres on the connection between globalisation, with its growth in world trade and 
exchange relations, and certain ecological effects especially concerning “North-South” 
relations. Through this example, the study is meant to provide empirical verifi cation of 
the hypothesis that globalisation has not only economic but also ecological dimensions. 
Theoretically, this may involve both uncoupling on the basis of modernization effects and 
a shifting of burdens on to weaker economies.
Chapter Two begins by asking whether a link can be demonstrated at world level between 
globalisation and any environmental effects. 
Chapter Three examines the extent to which environmental burdens have actually been 
shifted in the course of globalisation, and especially how this appears within a North-South 
perspective. Further studies will have to look in greater detail at causal links between glo-
balisation and the shifting of environmental burdens.
Finally, Chapter Four will summarize and discuss the main conclusions to be drawn from 
the empirical fi ndings.
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2  Globalisation Aspects of World Trade and 
the Evolution of Selected Pressures on the 
Environment
First of all, we shall focus on the globalisation of world trade in monetary terms, drawing 
out and elucidating certain characteristic patterns. The availability of the international 
data means that for now the investigation will have to be largely restricted to monetary 
fi gures. But, as far as possible, it would be desirable for further work to include compara-
tive physical data, which would allow the associated environmental effects to be more 
extensively analysed. 
Monetary world trade (imports as well as exports) increased considerably in the last twenty 
years of the twentieth century, almost tripling between 1990 and 1998. Sharp rises in rela-
tion to GDP (see Fig. 1) clearly marked the 1990s, in particular, as a decade of accelerated 
globalisation (see Enquete Kommission 2002; Le Monde diplomatique 2003). Measured 
by the rate of growth of imports and exports, globalisation took place mainly in the 1990s, 
and it affected the traditional industrial countries of the OECD less strongly than the 
newly industrializing countries (NICs), especially those located in Asia. 
The main share of world trade, however, takes place in the wealthy industrial countries, 
especially the United States and the European Union (Fig. 2). This has to do not with 
growth-rates but with the established level of foreign trade relations. In the 1990s fast-
developing Asian countries (especially China and Hong Kong) pushed their way into the 
main group of trading partners.
Table: Global Export Values and Export Prices since 1990.
World Export Value
Change in export prices of 
primary products
Bn. Dollors average annual % change % spec. Products
2001 1990-01 1990-02
All products  (a) 5984 5 -9 Primary products
Agricultural products 547 3 -6
    Food 437 3 -14
    Raw materials 110 1 -2
Mining products 790 4 -23
    Ores and other minerals 63 2 -8 Ferrous ores
    Fuels 616 5 6 Oil
    Non-ferrous ores 111 4 from -42 to -12 Zinc resp. Aluminium
Processed products 4477 6
    Iron and steel 130 2
    Chemicals 595 7
    Other semi-manufactured products 432 5
    Machinery and transport equipment 2453 7
      Motor vehicles 565 5
      Office and communication equipment 828 10
      Other machinery and transport equipment 1061 5
     Textiles 147 3
    Clothing 195 6
    Other consumption goods 525 5
(a)  incl. Unspecified products, which accounted for 3% of world exports in 2001.
Source: WTO
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If globalisation is measured in terms of a foreign trade surplus (exports minus imports), 
then we see that, in contrast to the early 1980s (when the oil-exporting countries still had 
the largest surpluses), in the late 1990s it was the industrial countries plus certain NICs 
(again mainly in Asia) which notched up the largest surpluses. World trade takes place 
chiefl y between these countries or regions. Africa – especially sub-Saharan Africa, with 
the exceptions of Nigeria and South Africa – has been largely excluded from this surge in 
world trade. Consequently, it is not really a matter of “globalisation”, but rather of more 
intensive inter-regional trade involving the participation of certain new trade partners. 
Measured in terms of the “openness of economies” (imports and exports as percentages 
of GDP), the increase in foreign trade occurred principally in the NICs of East Asia, 
Latin America and Eastern Europe. Their formerly low level also needs to be taken into 
account, of course. 
As to the ecological implications, it is particularly important to consider the share of raw 
materials in world trade during this period, as well as the shares of various countries and 
regions. Bernd Meyer, from the University of Osnabrück, has shown that in monetary 
terms world trade has increased since 1980 in processed goods but actually declined in 
raw materials (especially from mining) and semi-manufactured goods (e.g. iron and steel) 
(Meyer 2001). 
Figure 1: Global trends 1980-2000: Exports, GDP,
Primary energy consumption, CO2 emissions.
Source: WTO and US-DOE: Energy Information Administration
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Figure 2: Global exports 1980 and 1988 by region and country
— absolute and relative composition.
Source: WTO
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The following table shows that between 1990 and 2001 agricultural and mining produce, 
as well as iron and steel, experienced below-average annual growth in terms of total 
export values, whereas offi ce and communications equipment, for example, roughly dou-
bled its share of export values. It is striking that export prices for all primary products 
except oil (whose price is subject to large fl uctuations) declined between 1990 and 2002. 
Thus, despite relatively low growth in monetary terms, world trade in primary products 
may have expanded quite considerably in physical terms, and this physical growth should 
be attributed inter alia to the falling prices for primary products. 
At a global level no clear links appear between rising volume of world trade and parame-
ters of pressure on the environment. What is evident is a relative de-coupling of monetary 
and physical quantities (primary energy use and CO
2
 emissions) – see Fig. 1. By way of 
comparison, trends in the global extraction of raw materials would also need to be exam-
ined, as well as associated environmental effects. At present this cannot be done because 
of the lack of statistical data, especially for bulk raw materials such as sand and gravel or 
natural stone in developing and newly industrializing countries, but future research will 
seek to quantify total extraction levels by materials and by countries/regions. 
In the next chapter, it will be shown on the basis of physical (material fl ow) data that 
globalisation has involved a shift in “pressure on the environment” from the industrial 
countries to the newly industrializing and developing countries.
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3  Globalisation Aspects (Monetary and Physical) 
of EC/EU Foreign Trade, Together with Selected 
Environmental Implications
Although, at an aggregated global level, no clear link can be seen between growing world 
trade and a rise in worldwide pressure on the environment, the following chapter will ana-
lyse within a North-South perspective whether there have been regional shifts in environ-
mental burdens. Theoretically, a generally benefi cial trend may perfectly well go together 
with major shifts of this kind. We shall mainly focus here, as representative of the North, 
on the globalisation aspects of the European Unionʼs foreign trade. 
First, we shall consider the changing relationship between the EC/EUʼs physical trade 
fl ows and their monetary values. A look at physical trade fl ows will provisionally indicate 
whether environmental burdens have been shifted in the context of increasing (monetary) 
trade. The assumption that pressure on the environment potentially increases with a rise 
in physical trade fl ows will then need to be checked through more extensive analyses 
– for example, of the ecological rucksacks of foreign trade. 
EC/EU foreign trade links were fi rst studied by Giljum and Hubacek (2001), for the period 
from 1989 to 1999. However, they evaluated ecological rucksacks only with reference to 
EU-15 in the year 1990, with the help of a physical input-output model. The present study 
goes further by consistently comparing imports and exports between 1976 and 2000 in 
both monetary and physical terms, as well as their (physical) ecological rucksacks, and 
by examining the (physical) Total Material Requirement (TMR) and Total Material Con-
sumption (TMC). This makes it possible to draw solid conclusions concerning trends in 
the physical basis of the EC/EU economy and the importance of its foreign trade links in 
a context of globalisation of the world economy.
Trends in EC/EU Foreign Trade
In the following account of the changing relationship between the EC/EUʼs physical trade 
fl ows and their monetary values, it will be shown how the global material fl ow links of the 
EC/EU changed over the quarter-century from 1976 to 2000.
General Trends
Figures 3 and 4 depict EC/EU-15 imports and exports between 1976 and 2000 in  physical 
and monetary quantities. In the period from 1993 to 2000, both the EUʼs (monetary) imports 
of goods and its own exports showed a signifi cant upward trend – a clear  indication, fi rst 
of all, of increasing globalisation. Since these increases in monetary imports and exports, 
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and less strongly in physical exports, are greater than the corresponding trends in GDP or 
Direct Material Input (DMI = imports plus domestic extraction of raw materials), we may 
speak of an unambiguous globalisation effect (Fig. 4).
Extra-EC/EU versus intra-EC/EU (internal) trade
This study describes and analyses the external trade of the EC/EU with non-member-
states. First, we should briefl y explain the position of external trade within the EUʼs total 
(i.e., inclusive of internal) trade. 
The EC/EUʼs monetary external trade has risen signifi cantly since the mid-1990s. The 
increase in import and export values (ECUs) roughly doubled between 1993 and 2000, 
as the index values in Fig. 4 show. If account is also taken of trade within the EU, it 
becomes clear that (intra-EU) trade between EU member-states constitutes the greater 
part (two-thirds) of total trade – but that the trend is actually downward. This means that 
from the mid-1990s extra-EU trade increased by a greater amount than intra-EU trade. 
The EUʼs total physical external trade (intra plus extra) also shows increases, but these 
are less marked than the rises in the monetary values of external trade. In contrast to the 
monetary picture, the dominant element here is physical imports, approximately 60 per 
cent of which originate from countries outside the EU. In recent years, however, these 
physical imports have increased less sharply than physical imports in EU internal trade. 
Trade links within the EU account for approximately 70 per cent of its physical exports. 
The main conclusions are as follows:
• In the period from 1976 to 2000, both the imports and exports of the EC/EU 
displayed a signifi cant and at times striking upward trend – a clear indication 
of increasing globalisation.
• For the most part, the EC/EU buys cheap goods in the form of raw materials 
or little-processed goods, and sells expensive goods from sectors that mainly 
involve higher degrees of processing. It is true, however, that imports of high-
value goods did rise markedly from the mid-1990s on, to a relatively greater 
extent than exports of high-value goods. 
• Monetarily speaking, the developed economies conduct brisk business with 
one another. Physically, a kind of “feeder” fl ow occurs in this trade, in the 
shape of raw materials from developing and newly industrializing countries. 
• Little (and indeed less and less) EC/EU foreign trade is conducted with poor 
and highly indebted countries. The only exceptions are physical imports from 
high-debt countries, which, like developing countries in general, are a major 
and constant supplier of resources for the EC/EU
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Monetary and physical (extra-EC/EU) trade balance and 
“specifi c prices”
In monetary terms the EC/EU displays a roughly levelled trade balance, whereas in physi-
cal terms there is a clear import surplus. Physically, then, the EC/EU requires appreci-
ably more goods than it returns to the rest of the world. Imports exceed exports by 500 to 
1,000 million tonnes – that is, threefold to fi vefold – with a fl uctuation tendency between 
3 and 4 in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, monetary import and export values 
remained at a similar level throughout the period in question, with a maximum import 
surplus of 22 per cent in 1980 and a maximum export surplus of 8 per cent in 1996 but 
without any unambiguous trend. The specifi c prices (euros per kg.) of imports to the 
EC/EU were at 0.2 to 0.7 euros per kg always, and roughly to the same relation, below 
those of exports which ranged between 0.7 and 2.2 euros/kg. EC/EU fi nal exports were on 
average three times more expensive per kg. than imported goods, though with a declining 
tendency between 1995 and 2000. This indicates that the EU exports goods with consid-
erably higher value than it imports. 
Whereas the average specifi c prices of imports were roughly constant from 1982 to 1995, 
they increased by approx. 70 per cent between 1995 and 2000. This indicates that EU 
imports of high-value goods increased (import quantities rose over the same period by 
only 13 per cent). The specifi c prices of exports behaved in a similar fashion, rising by 
some 40 per cent between 1995 and 2000 after a previous period of stagnation. The clear 
rise in the value of exports, at a time when there was only a moderate quantitative rise (19 
per cent), also points to a more “refi ned” structure of export goods.
In the next section we shall look more closely at physical imports and exports by category 
and region.
Physical Imports by Country/Region and Category of Goods
In the period from 1982 to 2000, the largest share of EC/EU physical imports originated 
in the rest of Europe (Fig. 5), followed by America, Africa and Asia. In 1976 the largest 
share (42%) still came from Asia, but by 1982 this had fallen to 25% and in the years up 
to 2000 it stabilized around 15 to 20%. This was due mainly to sharply falling imports 
of oil from the Middle East. The percentage of imports from OECD countries, mostly in 
Europe, rose between 1976 and 1994 from 24% to 38%, but then fell continually to reach 
31% by the year 2000. Physical imports to the EC/EU from developing countries showed 
an especially sharp and almost continual decline, from 63% in 1976 to 41% in 1996 – a 
level that remained constant until 2000 and was still higher than the share of OECD coun-
tries. “Least developed countries” (LDCs) always accounted for a bare (and shrinking) 
minimum of the total, never higher than 4%.
This indicates that, with the rising absolute quantities of imports in the 1990s, increasing 
environmental burdens were also shifted mainly to other European countries. 
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In terms of income differentials, the EC/EUʼs physical imports came mainly from coun-
tries with a high to medium income (GDP per capita); only 7-10% of imports originated 
in “low income countries” (LICs). On the other hand, the EC/EU imported more from 
severely indebted countries (SICs: approx. 13-20%, with a tendency to fl uctuate). 
If individual partner countries of the EU are considered in terms of physical quantity of 
imports, then Norway, Russia, the United States, Brazil and Saudi Arabia accounted for 
35% to 43% of all imports in the period from 1995 to 2000.
The structure of the EC/EUʼs physical imports remained amazingly constant over the 25-
year period in question. Roughly three-quarters of physical imports from outside the EC/
EU were raw materials. Fuels were the dominant category of goods, with a constant share 
of 54% to 63% (Fig. 6). Then came crude ores (and concentrates), with 10% to 16%. Salts 
and minerals (3-4%) and timber (4-6%) were further raw materials or commodities with 
a low level of processing. These four groups of materials alone accounted for more than 
three-quarters of EC and EU imports expressed in tonnes. 
Between 1995 and 2000 the physical imports of EU-15 rose by 13 %. A large part (48%) 
of this increase was due to stronger imports of mineral fuels, and another part (12%) to 
imports of timber, while salt and minerals contributed only slightly (2%) to the increase in 
Figure 5: EC/EU physical imports and exports 1976–2000 by country and region.
Note: Other = unspecified, e.g. data kept secret; SICs = severely indebted countries;
LICs = low income countries; LDCs = least developed countries; DCs = developing countries
outside Europe.
Source: Eurostat Comext 2001.
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physical imports, and ores in the 1995–2000 period were actually imported in absolutely 
smaller quantities. Interestingly, however, the import of semi-manufactured iron and steel 
products increased by approx. 11 million tonnes during the same period and accounted for 
approx. 7% of the total increase in physical imports (17% for all metals). In the case of 
metals, there was evidently a shift towards imports with higher levels of processing. 
It is interesting that exports also increased in both categories of goods, and that exports 
were in more or less the same order of magnitude. One is struck that the euro values of 
exports were markedly higher than those of imports. Thus, trade was conducted in goods 
with different qualities but belonging to the same category: that is, lower-value iron and 
steel was imported into the EU (e.g. for buildings), while high-value iron and steel was 
produced in the EU and then exported. The same was probably true of mineral fuels, and 
perhaps for chemicals more generally.
Physical Exports by Country/Region and Category of Goods
Geographically speaking, export goods went fi rst of all to America and the rest of Europe 
(Fig. 7) – 14% to 20% to the United States alone, in the period after 1982. Roughly a half 
of physical EC/EU exports were destined for OECD countries (44-59%, with a tendency 
to fl uctuate), and, as far as EU-15 trade is concerned, exports to European OECD-coun-
tries accounted for roughly half of the OECD share. High export percentages also went 
Figure 6: EC/EU physical imports 1976–2000 by product group.
Source: Eurostat Comext 2001.
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to developing countries (28-38%, with a tendency to fl uctuate), but the share of “least 
developed countries” (LDCs) approached vanishing point at 2-4%.
In the period from 1976 to 2000, the EC/EU mostly exported to high-income OECD coun-
tries, but to an increased extent also to countries with upper medium income levels (10% 
in 1976 to 23% in 2000). Low-income countries (LICs), on the other hand, received few 
goods from the EC/EU (7-10%). In physical terms, the EC/EU exported less to severely 
indebted countries (SICs: 7-12%) than it imported from them (13-20%).
Around a third of the EC/EUʼs physical exports since 1981 have consisted of raw materi-
als. (The physical trade balance in raw materials, however, displays a clear import sur-
plus; the evolution of the physical trade balance by product groups will be described later 
– see also Table 2.) With exports as with imports, mineral fuels accounted for the largest 
individual share – between 23% and 34% (Fig. 8). Then came metals (16% to 26%), food 
products (10% to 22%), salts and minerals (7% to 13%) and chemicals (8% to 11%). 
Next, timber products accounted for 2% to 8%, and mineral products for 2% to 4%. The 
physical structure of exports thus appears to be more complex than that of imports, and 
product groups with an individual share below 2% of total exports in tonnes are bracketed 
together to make up 15% to 16% of all exports. Nevertheless, raw materials and semi-
manufactured goods made the main contribution to the total in tonnes, although this was 
less striking than in the case of imports. 
Figure 7: EC/EU physical exports 1976–2000 by country and region.
Note: Other = unspecified, e.g. data kept secret; SICs = severely indebted countries;
 LICs = low income countries; LDCs = least developed countries; DCs = developing countries
outside Europe.
Source: Eurostat Comext 2001.
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From 1976 to 2000 physical exports increased by approximately 128%, including a 7% 
leap between 1999 and 2000. This exceeded the increase in imports (51%) during the 
same period. As in the case of imports, mineral fuels were the largest category (26%) 
accounting for the rise in physical exports. The next-largest contribution came from food 
products (22%), followed by timber products (12%) and metals (11%). It should be inves-
tigated how far there is a link with world market prices for oil. 
Figure 8: EC/EU physical exports 1976–2000 by product group.
Source: Eurostat Comext 2001.
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The forces driving the greater demand of the EU and other industrial countries for 
resources from abroad (as measured by monetary and physical external trade) are 
obviously:
• Energy needs: lower domestic extraction has gone together with increased 
imports (with the exception of the United Kingdom, whose large domestic 
energy sources are also refl ected in high export totals). 
• Rising material requirements in processing industries, most evident in 
increased imports of timber and metals (as raw materials and semi-manufac-
tured goods). 
• All in all, the growing economic importance of export-oriented branches may 
have increasingly affected material-intensive precursors, as data on the com-
modity structure of exports would tend to suggest. Further studies are needed 
on this. 
• Further studies should also focus on the development of commodity prices
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Relocation of Physical Resource Extraction 
from the EC/EU to Other Regions
The above analysis of the EUʼs monetary and physical external trade points to increasing 
globalisation, especially in the 1990s. A study of other economies – incl. USA, Japan, 
UK and Germany – showed broadly similar globalisation aspects as for the EU, and 
confi rmed that also in a longer time-frame (stretching back to the early 1960s) globalisa-
tion was mainly a feature of the 1990s. Surprisingly, however, for reasons that are not 
yet known, globalisation was marked only in monetary and not physical data for non-EU 
countries that were the object of study (USA, Japan, China and Poland). It needs to be 
investigated how far the increased foreign trade of the EU during the 1990s was due to 
the single internal market, as it is possible that advantages from the single market had an 
effect on growth. The more intensive trade with Eastern Europe also points to European 
specifi cities. 
With regard to the EC/EUʼs rising physical imports from the rest of the world, this section 
will examine whether it was associated with a shift in resource extraction and also con-
sider the ecological rucksacks in this connection. We also need to investigate from which 
countries or regions a greater quantity of goods was obtained, and pay special attention to 
developing and newly industrializing countries. Apart from the aspect of ecological ruck-
sacks, the environmental implications will also be built into the picture through quantita-
tive analysis of pollution intensive goods (based on a World Bank study [Mani/Wheeler 
1997], although here the focus is mainly on atmospheric and water pollution and heavy 
metal emissions.
Shifts in Resource Extraction with Ecological Rucksacks Included
The direct material input (DMI) of the European Union (EU-15) remained more or less 
constant during the last two decades of the twentieth century (Fig. 9), which indicates a 
relative de-coupling from monetary economic growth. Yet no absolute reduction of direct 
material input, or of its non-renewable portion, can be identifi ed in the EU. Such a reduc-
tion, however (at least in the view of such experts as Daly 1990, 1992, or Costanza et al. 
1997), is the prerequisite for sustainable development in the sense of a fairer distribution 
of resource consumption, since natural restrictions mean that the per capita consump-
tion of industrial countries (which is far higher then in developing countries) cannot be 
extended throughout the world. 
DMI comprises domestic extraction of raw materials and (physical) imports expressed 
as absolute quantities. Whereas both the EUʼs internal resource extraction and its DMI 
developed in similar ways and at least in the 1990s did not grow, absolute physical imports 
considerably increased from the mid-1980s on, after a decline in the period from 1979 to 
1983, and clearly pointed to a shift in resource extraction to other countries/regions. The 
same result was found in all other economies under study that displayed clear (physical) 
globalisation tendencies. 
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The inclusion of ecological rucksacks supports this fi nding and, to some extent, indicates 
an even greater shift of the EUʼs resource requirement to other countries/regions. This was 
also observable in individual member-states such as Germany, United Kingdom, Finland 
and the Netherlands. In most cases the ecological rucksacks increased even more than 
absolute imports, especially for the EU since the mid-1990s. This suggests that globalisa-
tion enlarges the total foreign resource input and clearly favours the access of industrial 
countries (and newly industrializing countries) to resources in other regions. It should be 
investigated how far this is an unintended side-effect or a matter of economic calculation. 
As a rule, ecological rucksacks are not valued in economic terms and therefore have no 
price. It therefore seems likely that, where mining processes are strictly regulated, fi rms 
incur high transaction costs in complying with regulations. And it is possible that these 
costs may be reduced through relocation to less regulated economies.
Relocation of Resource Extraction by Region
As we have seen, as much as 41-63% of physical imports to the EC/EU came from 
developing countries. This indicates that, with the absolute rises in imports, the reloca-
tion of environmental burdens to developing countries continued at least as intensely as 
before. On this assumption, however, pressure on the environment will have appreciably 
increased in other European countries.
Figure 9: Development of various material input indicators: EU-15 1976–2000.
Note: DMI = Direct Material Input (Domestic raw material extraction plus absolute
imports); TMR = Total Material Requirement (absolute imports plus ecological rucksacks).
Source: Bringezu und Schütz 2001a,b; Eurostat 2002.
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The EC-EUʼs physical imports mainly consist of raw materials: between 1980 and 2000 
their share of total physical absolute imports remained more or less constant at around 
three-fourths (85% in 1976, falling to 78% by 1980), and in absolute quantities (tonnes) 
raw materials increased by 31% between 1976 and 2000. Imports of raw materials mainly 
rest upon a non-renewable foundation, which accounted rather constantly for 90% of the 
total during this period. 
Between 1976 and 2000, a rising proportion (16% to a third) of the EC/EUʼs absolute 
imports of raw materials came from other European countries (Fig.10), while a declining 
proportion (two-thirds to 43%) came from developing countries outside Europe. Through-
out the period in question, however, this latter group still made the largest contribution to 
the EC/EUʼs raw material requirement, and after the mid-1990s there was again a slight 
tendency for its share to increase. Newly industrializing countries in Europe played a 
special role in this, contributing a (clearly rising) share of 8-21% to the EC/EUʼs imports 
of raw materials. Towards the end of the period under study, approximately half as many 
(absolute) raw materials were coming from that source as from all developing countries 
outside Europe. Poor countries, however, supplied only 7-12% of the EC/EUʼs raw mate-
rial imports, and that fi gure showed a tendency to decrease. High-debt countries supplied 
14-22% (again with a tendency to decrease), and highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) 
no more than 3-7% (also decreasing). Sub-Saharan Africaʼs (declining) share of 9-15% 
was tending to become ever smaller than North Africaʼs relatively constant 9-13%. In the 
1990s poor and indebted countries outside Europe, especially in Africa, were increasingly 
driven from the market to supply Europe with exports, whereas the “emerging markets” 
of Eastern Europe clearly improved their position. 
When we look at imports of semi-manufactured and fi nished goods, this de-coupling 
of countries of the South is even more apparent (Fig. 11). Although we can assume that 
a large part of the raw materials for the production of semi-manufactured and fi nished 
goods still came from developing countries outside Europe, those goods themselves are 
mainly imported to Europe directly from rich industrial countries of the North – the share 
of rich OECD countries being 47% to 35%, though with a tendency to decline since the 
mid-1990s. Developing countries outside Europe together contributed 33-42%, also with 
a falling tendency between 1976 and 2000. Here too the newly industrializing countries 
of Europe had an increasing share (14-32%), though it reached its peak in 1995 and then 
fell to a constant 25%. 
Environmental Implications of Resource Relocation
A some what different picture from that of absolute quantities (cf. Fig. 10) emerges when 
we consider EC/EU imports of raw materials (Fig. 12 and Table 1) in relation to eco-
logical rucksacks (erosion quantities associated with imports of agricultural products and 
unused resource extraction – e.g. mining waste – in connection with imports of non-
renewable materials such as energy carriers, metals and minerals). These also applied 
mostly to developing countries, but unlike in the case of absolute imports of raw materials 
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the share of developing countries in the ecological rucksacks (ERs) of EU imports did 
not decline but remained more or less constant around 56% between 1976 and 2000. Also 
quite constant, at around a third, was the share in rucksacks from OECD countries. The 
trends were thus clearly unfavourable to developing countries: the EC/EU received more 
or less constantly high levels of direct imports from developing countries outside Europe, 
but this was associated with rising environmental pressure due to ecological rucksacks. 
This was true only in much weaker form (maximum 10% of total ERs) for newly indus-
trializing counties in Europe, as well as for OECD countries. On the other hand, the trend 
was even stronger in the case of highly indebted countries and NICs outside Europe: the 
share of severely indebted countries (SICs) rose from 25% in 1976 to 39% in 2000 of the 
ecological rucksacks of EC/EU raw material imports, while the share of developing coun-
tries outside Europe nearly doubled from 19% to 37%. It would appear that, as a result of 
the debt crisis, resources were exploited more intensively for exports to countries of the 
North, or that industrial development in countries of the South did not promote the export 
of less resource-intensive raw materials. Chileʼs evolution since 1973 provides impressive 
conformation of this thesis [Giljum 2002]. As it integrated into the world market between 
1973 and 2000, Chile increasingly exported resource-intensive goods, especially copper. 
In the end a diversifi cation of the Chilean economy, through the expansion of mainly 
export-oriented fruit-growing, forestry and fi shing, served only to expand the resource-
intensive sectors. In fact, of the 15 world regions identifi ed by the WTO, Latin America 
between 1976 and 2000 bore the brunt (one third) of the growing resource extraction and 
ecological rucksacks involved in imports by the EC/EU (and also contributed to the tune 
of 22% to the rise in direct absolute quantities of imports). This needs to be investigated 
further. Most of the ecological rucksacks from developing countries outside Europe fall 
to non-renewable raw materials (87% in 2000), mainly ores (63%) and energy sources 
(23%). Erosion made up 13% of the ecological rucksack of the EUʼs raw material imports 
in the year 2000.
In 2000, the pressure on the environment due to ecological rucksacks of imports stood 
at 3.8 to 1: that is, one tonne of imported raw materials resulted in 3.8 tonnes of erosion 
or unused extraction material in the countries of origin (Table 1). Imports from OECD 
countries showed a roughly similar picture (4 to 1). Imports from newly industrializing 
countries in Europe actually showed a lighter burden, with 1.6 tonnes rucksack per tonne 
of raw materials. By contrast, imported goods from developing countries outside Europe 
carried a burden of approximately 5 to 1, and those from poor indebted countries (HIPCs) 
and sub-Saharan Africa as much as 13 to 1 – with a tendency to above-average increases 
between 1976 and 2000.
It should be investigated further how far resource extraction has actually been relocated 
from the EC/EU to developing countries. For metals (ores) this has certainly been the case 
(e.g., Germany since the early 1990s has ceased all production of ores), but for other min-
erals detailed studies need to be made. It also needs to be investigated how much certain 
developing countries have engaged in over-exploitation – for example, by switching to 
marginal locations or by satisfying the new demand for precious metals.
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Apart from ecological rucksacks, the quantifi cation of pollution intensive goods has also 
been used to assess the ecological implications. On the basis of a World Bank study (Mani/
Wheeler 1997), we shall refer to ten product groups from the most polluting branches: iron 
and steel, non-iron metals, chemicals (industrial and other), mineral fuels, non-metallic 
mineral products, cellulose and paper, rubber goods, leather goods and metal goods. The 
data therefore include indistinguishably both raw materials and semi-manufactured and 
Geostrategic Resources and Confl icts
Increasing demand for electronic goods such as mobile telephones, computers and 
video-cameras in the wealthy countries of the North has caused average annual 
rises of 8% to 12% in the demand for tantalum. Tantalum ores are found mainly in 
Australia, Canada, Brazil and Central Africa, with smaller quantities in South-East 
Asia [Tantalum Niobium International Study Center: 2003].
Demand for tantalum has been increasing (2267 tonnes in 2000, the highest ever 
– Hunziker 2002), as has its value (approx. US$730 per kilogram of Ta2O5 raw 
ore from Central Africa in the year 2000: prices for tantalum soared 41% between 
1995 and 2001, to reach US$1000 in the year 2000 – Hunziker 2002). The bulk 
of the world tantalum trade, amounting to US$6 billion a year, comes from legal 
mines in Australia, Canada and Brazil. But a less transparent market has also been 
developing in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Belligerent rebel groups, often supported from neighbouring Rwanda and 
Uganda, have often in recent years used income from tantalum (known as Coltan, 
a Columbit-Tantalit ore) to fi nance a bloody civil war involving major human 
rights violations; the abuse of child-soldiers in a double sense has attracted special 
attention here (Keitetsi 2002). Congolese rebels and Rwandan soldiers control 
the illegal extraction of ore under inhuman conditions, often by children, and also 
steal ore from legal mines (Koetsier 2002).
Having heard of civil wars and the plundering of national parks (e.g., the number 
of lowland gorillas in the east of the DR of Congo has been whittled down from 
8000 to 1000; and the elephant population in Kahuzi-Biega National Park in the 
Congo has been virtually wiped out in the context of tantalum exports from Central 
Africa – Hunziker 2002), the Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center in 
Brussels called on its members (leading corporations in the USA, Canada, Japan, 
Europe and elsewhere) to obtain their raw materials only from legal sources. All 
the large global corporations declared that they would have nothing to do with this 
“bloody” tantalum (Worthington 2000). 
One consequence of the world attention was that tantalum ore was taken illegally 
from Congo to Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, where it was then exported (often 
via several intermediaries) by legal trading corporations. This is made easier by the 
fact that the tantalum market, unlike the nickel or copper market, for example, is 
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decentralized (Hunziker 2002). Trading fi rms use international transport companies 
to ship ore to processing fi rms in countries of the North, which produce tantalum 
powder, wire and other semifi nished goods from it. In the next stage, condensers 
and other components are produced from the tantalum powder, and these are then 
supplied to high-tech corporations such as Ericsson, Intel and Nokia. Effective 
control over the origin of raw materials must therefore be considered unrealistic. 
The reserves in Congo are estimated to be the fourth-largest in the world. At current 
levels of consumption, global tantalum reserves are expected to last another 16 
years, and so major efforts are going into exploration for new deposits. Alternatives 
such as Niobium are also being sought, but tantalum seems to have no competitors 
for storage capacity and is predicted to have a “glittering future” (Hunziker 2002).
In September 2001 the US House of Representatives passed a resolution prohibiting 
the purchase of tantalum from Congo. In November 2001 the UN published a second 
report on the situation in Congo and held the mining companies responsible.
It demanded an embargo on trade in minerals (not only tantalum but also gold and 
diamonds, as well as tropical wood) from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, until it 
becomes clear who is involved in the incidents in Congo (UN 2001). To date no 
such embargo has been implemented.
The EU Commission has not yet seen any need to act itself and refers instead to 
the activities of the UN (EU C161 E/7, 10 July 2003). The International Peace 
Information Service, a Belgian NGO, published a report in January 2002 (“European 
Companies and the Coltan Trade: Supporting the War Economy in the DRC”) 
which names certain coltan-importing corporations in Europe (Belgium, Germany 
and Switzerland) with links to rebel groups in Central Africa. It also demands 
that the relatively high (and from 1995 to 2000 rising) EU development aid to the 
relevant countries of Central Africa should be made conditional on democratization 
and peace-making (Koetsier 2002). The EUʼs (essentially Franceʼs) current 
commitment, under the terms of Resolution 1484 of the UN Security Council, to 
stabilize security and to improve the humanitarian situation in the DR Congo at 
least gives reason to hope that the immediate confl ict will be solved.
Between 1989 and 1996, the EC/EU imported niobium and tantalum ores in ever 
greater quantities – up from approx. 2,000 tonnes to approx. 56,000 tonnes. In 
1997 this particular import almost entirely collapsed to a level of 151 tonnes, and 
by the year 2000 it was down to just 16 tonnes. The origin of the huge imports 
between 1993 and 1996 is shrouded in almost complete secrecy. The smaller 
quantities imported between 1989 and 1992 (mainly from Canada) and between 
1997 and 2000 (from South Africa, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Kazakhstan and 
Lithuania) are comprehensively listed by country. In 1997 just one tonne of ore 
was imported from Congo, and in 1999 two tonnes. This would suggest that the 
EU does not currently play a major role in the global tantalum trade (authors  ʼnote: 
data according to Eurostat Comext 2001).
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Between 1989 and 1999, the EC/EU imported increasing quantities of semifi nished 
and fi nished tantalum products (raw metal, powder, wire, condensers, etc.) - up 
from 515 to 3941 tonnes, but down in 2000 to 2272 tonnes. These came essentially 
from the United States and the Czech Republic, followed at a considerable distance 
by South Africa, Thailand, Japan, Israel and Mexico. Evidently, in the 1990s the 
EU increasingly replaced raw material imports with imports of processed tantalum, 
so that it is scarcely possible any more to trace the origin of the raw materials 
(authors  ʼnote: data according to Eurostat Comext 2001).
Furthermore, between 1989 and 2000 the EC/EU imported large quantities of 
tantalum as a secondary material, especially ashes and residue, as well as smaller 
quantities of waste and scrap. Imports fl uctuated enormously between 250 tonnes 
and 554,000 tonnes (in 1996), with generally higher values in the late 1990s. 
These came almost entirely from Malaysia, so that it was evidently a question of 
bye-products of tin production from cassiterite ore concentrates.
Small amounts of secondary material were also sporadically imported from Thai-
land and Singapore. The highest imports of secondary tantalum in 1996 coincided 
with the maximum levels for primary ore imports and even matched them in ton-
nage. It should be investigated how far the relatively high imports of secondary 
materials between 1997 and 2000 were able to substitute for the almost completely 
interrupted imports of primary ores, and what were the ecological and socio-eco-
nomic implications. (Authors  ʼnote: data according to Eurostat Comtext 2001.)
Kristi Essik: “A call to arms. How the demand for cell phones and computer chips is helping fuel 
a bloody civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, The Industry Standard Magazine 2001. 
http://fl etcher.tufts.edu/humansecurity/con2/ws2/essik.pdf
Table 1: Ecological rucksacks of EU raw material imports in 2000
and changes since 1976 (EC).
Mn. tonnes in 2000 Change compared to 1976 Ers per t. raw material in 2000 Change compared to 1976
Total 4.022 186% 3,8 119%
OECD 1.235 141% 4,0 33%
DCs 2.237 186% 4,9 235%
NICs Europa 352 252% 1,6 18%
SICs 1.579 355% 8,8 274%
LICs 563 158% 7,1 124%
LDCs 330 174% 12,1 207%
HIPCs 435 174% 12,6 173%
Sub-Saharan Africa 638 201% 6,2 123%
Ecological rucksacks (ERs) of imported raw materials
Note: HIPCs = highly indebted poor countries; LDCs = least developed countries;
LICs = low income countries; SICs = severely indebted countries; NICs Europe
 = newly industrializing countries in Europe; DCs = developing countries.
Source: Eurostat Comext 2001 and own caculations.
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fi nished goods. The classifi cation is based on polluting factors in the form of atmospheric 
and water emissions, as well as heavy metal emissions. A further distinction has been 
made in the category of pollution intensive goods between those with and those without 
mineral fuels: the latter involve pollution in the producing or exporting economies that 
mainly puts direct pressure on the environment through emissions or waste; whereas the 
former mainly put pressure on the global environment through atmospheric emissions 
due to combustion in the consuming or importing economies.
The years 1976 to 2000 saw increasing imports of pollution intensive goods into the 
EC/EU (Fig. 13a). In 2000 these were running at 991 million tonnes (164 without fuels 
– see Fig. 13b) – which was roughly 50% higher than in 1976 (180% higher without 
fuels). Pollution intensive goods in general accounted for 63-72% of all imports into the 
EC/EU; those without mineral fuels accounted for 6-11% of all imports, with a clearly 
rising trend. 
In 2000 a large part of these imports came from developing countries (41%), though there 
had been a sharp fall since 1976 when the fi gure stood at 73%. OECD countries made 
up the second-largest share (30% in 2000, with a strong tendency to increase since 1976, 
when they stood at 14%). The same is true of newly industrializing countries in Europe, 
which accounted for 24% of all the EC/EUʼs imports of pollution intensive goods in the 
year 2000, as against 11% in 1976. With regard to pollution intensive imported goods 
without mineral fuels, the main purchases were from OECD countries (49%) and newly 
industrializing countries of Europe (41%), whose share had risen sharply since 1976 
(16%), while corresponding imports from OECD countries had shrunk from 70% in 1976 
to 49% in 2000. (In absolute terms, these imports from OECD countries amounted to 41 
million tonnes in 1976 and 81 million tonnes in 2000.) Imports of “dirty industry” goods 
from developing countries also showed a striking increase, from 8 million tonnes in 1976 
to 45 million tonnes in 2000 (when they accounted for 27% of the corresponding total 
imports). Pollution associated with the import of pollution intensive goods, especially 
those without mineral fuels, probably also involves what is actually local output-based 
pollution. But, because of differences in technology, etc., the specifi c intensity of pollu-
tion may be very different around the world – and hence also the absolute distribution of 
the actual pressure on the environment. 
It is interesting that developing countries outside Europe have a clearly increasing share 
of “dirty industry” goods without mineral fuels (up from 13% to 27% or, in absolute 
terms, from approx. 8 to 45 million tonnes). This is similar to the picture we have seen in 
the case of ecological rucksacks (which refers only to raw materials). Thus, developing 
countries outside Europe have improved their share of export production for the EC/EU; 
this is also true, in a weaker form, for newly industrializing countries outside Europe, 
which increased their share of such exports from 7% in 1976 to 16% in 2000. However, 
the main rise in import share of such goods was achieved by European NICs (up from 
16% in 1976 to 41% in 2000). If it is true that production involving intensive pollution 
due to emissions is being increasingly relocated in NICs, then this applies especially to 
the “emerging markets” of Eastern Europe, but also to the NICs of the South. All that can 
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be initially established here is that there has been an absolute increase in such imports. 
Further analysis of production data for these sectors would be necessary to clarify the 
extent to which pollution-intensive production has been relocated abroad through the 
dismantling of domestic production capacities.
Unequal Ecological Exchange
In this section we shall investigate the EC/EUʼs exchange relations in world trade. The 
central question here is whether they lead to unequal ecological exchange. According to 
Andersson and Lindroth (2001), unequal ecological exchange denotes inequality between 
imports and exports. The physical trade balances (PTBs) of the ecological rucksacks and 
of the total resource requirements of an economic area (imports minus exports), may be 
adduced as indicators of unequal ecological exchange. 
Unequal ecological exchange will be investigated here in terms of the balance of imported 
and exported ecological rucksacks. 
PTB inclusive of ecological rucksacks: an import surplus means here that the total strain 
on resources is greater than the domestic strain associated to exports, i.e., that the envi-
ronment comes under further pressure in other countries. 
The PTB of goods involving pollution intensive production will also be examined here: 
what is said here refers to production pollution in the form of emissions and waste. For 
a more differentiated analysis of the features and distribution of such pollution, the PTB 
of goods involving pollution intensive production might fi rst be reckoned separately for 
particular product groups and products. This analysis might then be deepened, for exam-
ple, through special investigation of regional environmental pollution by production tech-
nologies, in order to assess any effects of pollution or relief measures in comparison with 
the status quo ante.
The PTB of absolute imports and exports has also been investigated: an import surplus 
might mean here that goods are obtained to a greater extent than before from the world 
market, and that consequently the domestic environment of another state or the regional/
global environment has been more heavily polluted by waste and emissions resulting 
from domestic activities. It may be assumed, however, that the ecological balance may be 
correlated with the PTB of absolute quantities of goods only if the commodity structure 
of the imports and exports has not changed. In other words, the ecological balance might, 
for example, remain absolutely constant despite a changed PTB. It should also be borne 
in mind that, even with an absolutely even PTB between trading partners, there may be 
an unequal distribution of environmental burden in the form of ecological rucksacks of 
the traded goods (as in the example of Chileʼs PTB with and without ecological rucksacks 
(Giljum 2002).
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A less desirable consequence of the uneven ecological exchange is the “rich country illu-
sion effect” (Andersson/Lindroth 2001). The use of imports to relocate environmental 
pollution may wrongly lead one to assume that a countryʼs environmental performance 
has improved, if one simply takes into account its internal levels of pollution.
The main results are as follows:
• The EC/EUʼs physical trade balance (in tonnes) is increasingly uneven: it 
imports considerably more goods than it exports. In monetary terms, however, 
its foreign trade tends to balance out. 
• The “ecological rucksacks” of imports exceed those of exports.  Since the mid-
1990s the PTB incl. ecological rucksacks of the EC/EU has risen considerably 
more than the PTB in absolute quantities. The total net resource requirement 
of the EC/EUʼs foreign trade has therefore increased. Because of the unequal 
ecological exchange, the EC/EUʼs total net resource requirement has remained 
more or less constant, whereas a focus purely in terms of domestic conditions 
would suggest the opposite. 
• As a whole, pollution intensive goods are also clearly and increasingly imported 
in greater quantity than they are exported. After the mid-1980s, however, the 
PTB in such goods without mineral fuels tended to balance out, since to date 
more of these goods had been exported than imported. Furthermore, increas-
ing absolute quantities of imports and exports underlie this even balance, so 
that in absolute terms foreign production locations have displayed increasing 
environmental pressure. It should be investigated how far this is due to tougher 
environmental policies in the EU. 
• Uneven ecological exchange has increased in the context of globalisation, 
whereas the domestic pressure on resources has decreased. On the other hand, 
the total pressure on resources that can be attributed to consumption within the 
EC/EU has remained constant. 
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Examples of the Relocation of Environmental Pollution
The introduction of the autocatalyst some fi fteen years ago in Western Europe has 
helped to reduce motor-car emissions and atmospheric pollution. Nevertheless, 
this is an example of the (scarcely noticed) relocation of pollution in the form 
of ecological rucksacks and production processes whose emissions pollute the 
environment.
The production of a regulated three-way catalyst requires precious metals of the 
platinum group (PGM), platinum, palladium and rhodium. These have an ecological 
rucksack of around 300,000 (300 kgs of ore must be processed to obtain 1 gram of 
PGM). For a single catalyst this means a rucksack up to 6,000 kgs – or 40 grams of 
resource consumption per kilometre driven, more than the oil consumption for the 
same distance. The ecological rucksack directly pollutes the countries supplying 
the PGMs, mainly South Africa and Russia.
In Norilsk, Siberia, the Norilsk Nickel company mostly processes palladium ore 
with antiquated technology. This generates huge amounts of sulphur dioxide – 
estimated at 2.8 million tonnes a year, roughly equivalent to Germanyʼs total SO
2
 
output ten years ago. This has been considerably reduced in recent years (down 
by three-fourths until 2000), but Norilsk still fi gures as the most heavily polluted 
town in Russia, and probably in the world. In addition to the SO
2
, there are various 
heavy metal emissions and an unimaginable pollution of the soil and water. The 
Norilsk emissions damage the forest over an area of 7,520 square kilometres, and 
the heavy metals can be detected as far away as Canada and Scandinavia. Some of 
the ore extracted by Norilsk is further processed on the Kola Peninsula, with the 
aforementioned ecological consequences. Because of their proximity to Norway 
and Finland, however, these production processes attract more attention in the 
West than the distant problems in Norilsk.
Demand for PGMs is growing and is expected to grow further – together with the 
transfer of severe ecological disadvantages to the producer countries. Minimum 
standards for PGM production at least are therefore essential to prevent catastrophic 
consequences for the environment. Cooperation throughout the production 
chain and between governments is indispensable. The direct impact on Norway 
has already contributed to fi nancial aid for environmentally cleaner production 
equipment in neighbouring Russia. Thorough renovation of Norilskʼs remote 
production sites would, however, require considerably greater investment as well 
as the application of managerial, administrative and environmental expertise. This 
places a responsibility on the automobile industry – in its own interests. It is to 
be expected that, with rising demand and stable or rising prices for PGMs, the 
production of the material will also be more effi cient.
Reinier de Man, Umweltzerstörung: Sauberes Auto – schmutziges Siberien, 
Munich: Ökon Verlag, 2003
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Physical and Monetary Trade Balance of the EC/EU
In the period from 1976 to 2000, the EC/EU constantly showed a clear import surplus in 
tonnes; the physical trade balance totalled between 531 million and 1 billion tonnes, with 
a tendency to increase (Table 2). By far the largest contributor to this was mineral fuels 
(67% to 76%), followed by metals (10% to 20%). The imbalance between imports and 
exports grew by approximately 32% over the period. Apart from biomasses, for which a 
declining trend was perceptible, all the other main categories showed a clear increase in 
the physical trade balance between 1976 and 2000. 
The monetary trade balance shows export surpluses between 1993 and 1998 and import 
surpluses between 1976 and 1992 (except 1986) and in 1999 and 2000 (Table 2). Export 
surpluses were continually recorded for metals and other products, import surpluses for 
biomasses and mineral fuels, and a variation of import and export surpluses for minerals. 
The monetary balances came to a maximum of approximately 22% of the total volume 
of imports and exports (which roughly equalled each other), and were thus far lower than 
the physical balances (up to 400% of total export volumes). 
In physical terms, therefore, the EU constantly used up more materials than it delivered 
to the rest of the world (without ecological rucksacks); imports tended to consist of low-
value, little-processed goods, and exports of high-value, highly processed goods. 
The EC/EUʼs average import prices rose considerably between 1976 and 2000, by 0.2 to 
0.7 ecus per kg (Table 3), mineral fuels being the cheapest (0.08 to 0.18 ecus per kg) and 
metal goods as well as other products the most expensive. 
The EC/EUʼs average export prices also rose considerably between 1976 and 2000, by 
0.8 to 2.2 ecus per kg (Table 3). As for imports, mineral fuels were cheapest export com-
modities (0.09 to 0.25 ecus per kg) and metal goods the most expensive (1.7 to 6.4 ecus 
per kg). 
In general, the import-export price ratio remained more or less constant, at 0.2 to 0.3 
(Table 4). In the metal and mineral groups, as well as mineral fuels, imports were always 
appreciably cheaper than exports.
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Trade Balance of Ecological Rucksacks of the EC/EU
The EC/EUʼs physical trade balance (imports minus exports) has been considered with 
the inclusion of ecological rucksacks. As we said before, this PTB of ecological rucksacks 
seems to us most appropriate for the consideration of uneven ecological exchange. 
Between 1976 and 2000, the EC/EU showed a clear and rising import surplus without 
ecological rucksacks, up to as much as 1 billion tonnes (Fig. 14). This uneven picture is 
considerably sharpened when we include the ecological rucksacks, as that demonstrates 
a maximum import surplus of 5.3 billion tonnes in the year 2000. The same may be said 
of the total resource requirement (absolute physical imports minus exports, both inclusive 
of ecological rucksacks), which rose to a maximum of 6.3 billion tonnes in the year 2000 
from around 3 billion tonnes in the 1976-1987 period. The whole increase took place in 
two periods, 1984-1989 and 1994-2000, with a decrease in between. Altogether, then, the 
EC/EU constantly and increasingly used more physical resources than it made available 
to the rest of the world. Inclusion of the ecological rucksacks makes it clear that the sta-
tistically unrecorded net resource requirement is three to fi ve times larger than the simple 
volume of trade.
Figure 14: Physical trade balance (PTB) with and without ecological rucksacks:
EC/EU 1976-2000.
Note: Physical trade balance = imports minus exports.
Source: Eurostat Comext 2001 and Wuppertal Institute data base.
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Box: Less Pollution Possible Also with Unequal 
Ecological Exchange
Unequal ecological exchange does not necessarily have to result in greater pressure 
on the environment. It can also lead to reduced pressure on the environment, when 
the unequal ecological exchange is maintained and, at the same time, the volume 
of trade (imports plus exports) actually increases.
The following imaginary example illustrates this with reference to resource 
extraction including ecological rucksacks*:
In the fi rst period, the developed countries (North) extract 100 units from their 
domestic environment. The developing countries (South) extract 50 units from 
their environment. Together this gives a worldwide resource extraction of 150 
units.
The North exports only 5 units to the South but imports 30 units from the South. 
This gives an unequal ecological exchange of 25 units – that is, the North imports 
25 units more from the South than it exports there.
In the second period, the North reduces its internal extraction to 80 units, while 
the South increases its own to 60 units. This gives a total worldwide reduction in 
resource extraction from 150 to 140 units, and so the pressure on the environment 
decreases.
At the same time, both have expanded their trade: the North now imports 40 
instead of 30 units from the South, and exports 15 instead of 5 units to the South. 
In this way, the unequal ecological exchange remains unchanged from the fi rst 
period, at a total of 25 units. Altogether, however, the pressure on the environment 
decreases.
*  The example is also comprehensible in terms of other indicators of pollution (e.g., energy 
consumption, waste, CO
2
 emissions, etc.)
1 2 3
domestic resource 
extraction (incl. ecol. 
rucksacks)
physical imports (incl. 
ecol. rucksacks)
physical exports (incl. 
ecol. rucksacks)
before after before after before after
North (developed countries) 100 => 80 30 => 40 5 => 15
South (developing  countries)  50          =>       60  5            =>      15 30          =>        40
World (total) 150         =>     140          35           =>      55 35          =>        55
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Balance of Pollution Intensive Goods
Between 1976 and 1997, the EC/EU always imported a greater amount (3 to 5 times more) 
of pollution intensive goods as a whole (as previously defi ned) than it exported (Fig. 15a). 
After the 1976-1988 period of relative stability (measured by PTB) in the external trade 
relationship, the import surplus increased considerably and peaked at 700 million tonnes 
a year in the 1990s. Unequal international exchange of pollution intensive goods appar-
ently continued in the case of the EC/EU. It is quite clear that, especially in the 1990s, 
pollution intensive products were purchased abroad in greater quantity. This correlates in 
time with the general tendencies to globalisation, as well as with similar rates of increase 
(37% from 1990 to 2000) to those in external trade as a whole (31%).
Less marked is the unequal external trade relationship (PTB) for pollution intensive goods 
without mineral fuels (Fig. 15b). In that case, from the mid-1980s on, there was a fairly 
even import-export ratio, although considerably more had been exported than imported 
up to the mid-1980s. Thus, the PTB in pollution intensive goods without mineral fuels 
has also developed in such a way that foreign production locations display greater pres-
sure on the environment. Moreover, both imports and exports of these goods increased 
almost constantly in absolute terms between 1976 and 2000, with considerably higher 
rates of increase than for pollution intensive goods as a whole (cf. Fig. 15a). It should be 
investigated how far these trends correlate with tougher environmental policies in the EU, 
and there should also be detailed analysis both of the product structure and of regional 
specifi cities in the production of pollution intensive goods.
Figure 15a: Total external trade in pollution intensive goods: EC/EU 1976–1997.
Source: Eurostat Comext 2001 and own calculations.
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No Increase in Domestic Consumption of Materials
Although the EUʼs physical trade balances (in the form of “ecological rucksacks” and 
pollution-intensive goods) are uneven – which means that unequal ecological exchange 
is present, as shown especially in the PTB of the ecological rucksacks – the total pres-
sure on resources attributable to domestic consumption within the EU has remained con-
stant. This indicates a relative de-coupling of resource consumption from monetary eco-
nomic growth. However, it is not possible to establish any signifi cant absolute reduction 
in the EUʼs total material requirement (TMR), in the high proportion of non-renewable 
resources within that requirement, or in total material consumption (analogous to direct 
material input, or DMI, as previously described). In the view of certain experts, however 
(e.g. Daly 1990, 1992; Costanza et el. 1997), such a reduction is the prerequisite for 
sustainable development in the sense of a fairer distribution of resource consumption, 
since per capita consumption levels in industrial countries – which are far higher than in 
developing countries – cannot be achieved worldwide because of natural restrictions. Up 
to now, we know of only exceptional cases where an absolute uncoupling of total mate-
rial consumption and economic growth has occurred (Bringezu et al, forthcoming). The 
central issue with regard to “resource justice” appears to be that per capita consumption in 
the countries of the North has not declined. These per capita considerations should always 
include the import-export balance, since an exclusive focus on domestic (per capita) con-
sumption may lead to wrong conclusions. Globalisation heightens the danger of “wrong 
conclusions”, as more and more goods are imported and exported. 
The greater use of foreign resources to cover the EUʼs material input does not serve inter-
nal consumption alone, but increasingly also the production of goods for export. This 
demonstrates the EUʼs growing role in the resource requirement of other economies. On 
Figure 15b: Total external trade in pollution intensive goods.
Source: Eurostat Comext 2001 and own calculations.
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the other hand, the internal fi nal demand for goods has remained quantitatively more or 
less constant.
If the ecological rucksacks are factored in, their increase in the EUʼs imports and exports 
means that in global terms the EU consumed roughly the same resources between 1980 and 
2000; its global Total Material Consumption or TMC (domestic extraction plus imports 
and minus exports, in each case incl. ecological rucksacks) varied between a maximum of 
8% higher and 7% lower than in 1980 (Fig. 16). This relatively constant or even declining 
(in the 1990s) TMC suggests that globalisation has not led to greater EU consumption of 
resources. But it needs to be further investigated how far various elements have affected 
this evolution of TMC (e.g., transport, eco-effi cient modernization processes, population 
trends, etc.). These elements probably point in different “directions”: for example, trans-
port growth certainly contributes to increased material consumption. But this is obviously 
offset by other elements.
Goods and Regions with Increasing Importance in the Physical 
External Trade of the EC/EU and Other Aspects
In this section we shall investigate which goods have an increasing quantitative impor-
tance in the foreign trade of the EC/EU. Along with a general consideration of product 
groups, we shall investigate the role of developing and newly industrializing countries in 
connection with import growth.
Figure 16: Development of total material requirement and consumption:
EU-15 1980–2000.
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Imports in General
The present structure of the EC/EUʼs physical imports is as follows:
Fossil fuels, metals and metal products clearly dominate the physical range of imports 
and their ecological rucksacks (Fig. 17).
Then come biomasses from agriculture.
Between 1976 and 2000, the structure of EC/EU imports – as well as exports – did not 
change essentially in respect of specifi c DMI or specifi c TMR; the greater import and 
export turnover therefore also points to increased group-specifi c pressure on the environ-
ment associated with external trade. 
The structure of absolute imports (DMI) between 1976 and 2000 also showed fossil fuels 
in the dominant position, followed by metals and metal products (Fig. 17). The picture is 
The main results are as follows:
• Non-renewable materials (fossil fuels, metals and metal goods) play a domi-
nant role in both imports and exports. The structure of the EC/EUʼs imports 
and exports did not essentially change between 1976 and 2000 in relation 
either to the specifi c DMI or the specifi c TMR; at the same time, the growth 
in the quantitative turnover of both imports and exports points to increased 
group-specifi c pressure on the environment associated with external trade.
• From developing countries outside Europe the EC/EU imported, in particular, 
environmentally intensive goods with a relatively low degree of processing 
(ores, mineral fuels). Imports from developing countries as a whole remained 
constantly high. Large increases were recorded for certain quantitatively still 
unimportant product groups from branches with a higher manufacturing depth. 
To some extent, then, a switch to high-value export goods also occurred in 
developing countries.
• Imports from European NICs have been sharply increasing, with a diverse 
product structure and higher levels of processing. Above-average increases 
occurred – as previously described in the case of developing countries – for 
quantitatively still unimportant product groups from branches with a high 
manufacturing depth. 
• Most raw material imports are of goods that cannot be gained at all within the 
EU, or only in small quantities (coffee, cocoa beans, cotton, fossil fuels, ores, 
rare minerals, etc.). These come to a large but declining extent from develop-
ing countries, and to an increasing extent from European NICs and highly 
indebted countries
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similar when account is taken of the ecological rucksacks - only then metals and metal 
products come before fossil fuels. In 2000, the share of non-renewable imports in the EC/
EU was 79% of absolute imports. This fi gure has scarcely fallen since 1976 (84%), and 
the same is true of renewable imports (12 or 14%). Thus, the EC/EUʼs physical demand 
on resources (DMI) abroad has largely continued to rest on a non-renewable and therefore 
non-sustainable basis. This fi nding is considerably strengthened if we include the ecologi-
cal rucksacks: 89% of the EC/EUʼs total material requirement (TMR) in 2000 rested on a 
non-sustainable basis, up from 79% in 1976; and the share of renewable imports (TMR) 
fell from 20% in 1976 to 9% in 2000. 
Without exception, absolute imports (DMI) of the main groups of materials increased 
through the period. The EC/EUʼs material input from abroad scarcely changed its struc-
ture between 1976 and 2000, although absolute imports (up 51%) and the total material 
requirement (up 96%) considerably increased during this period, the largest proportion in 
each case being on a non-renewable basis. A trend towards sustainable global pressure on 
resources is therefore not discernible in the EC/EU. Rather, in absolute terms, the global 
demand has increasingly been for non-renewable materials. 
As far as absolute imports are concerned, some of the highest increases over the period 
in question were recorded by other than the quantitatively principal groups of materials. 
Most conspicuous here were imports of fi sh products and synthetic materials. As to the 
ecological rucksacks, it was mainly fossil fuels, metals and metal products, together with 
minerals and mineral-derived products, which contributed to the rise in the total material 
requirement through imports.
Exports as a whole
As in the case of imports, fossil fuels, metals and metal products contributed most to the 
EC/EUʼs absolute exports and their ecological rucksacks (Fig. 18). Most striking in com-
parison with the import structure are the high export shares of minerals, biomasses from 
agriculture and other unspecifi ed products. 
In 2000, the share of non-renewable goods in the EC/EUʼs absolute exports (DMI) was 
60%, which is considerably lower than for import goods (79%). This was somewhat down 
on the 1976 fi gure of 69%. Unlike in the case of imports, then, the EC/EUʼs physical 
exports clearly and increasingly corresponded to the requirements of sustainable develop-
ment (if not yet to a satisfactory degree). This was less true of the total material require-
ment (TMR) of exports, however, 76% of which was of non-sustainable origin in the year 
2000 (slightly down from the 1976 fi gure of 82%). 
The EC/EUʼs exports and their ecological rucksacks also increased over the period under 
investigation. Of the main exported materials, high increases were recorded especially 
for fossil fuels, metals and metal products, as well as biomasses from agriculture. The 
EC/EUʼs exports did change signifi cantly between 1976 and 2000, in the sense that the 
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non-renewable share of absolute exports (DMI) fell from 69% to 60% - although this was 
still associated with an absolute increase in non-renewable exports. The non-renewable 
TMR for exports fell in essentially the same way, so that we may anyway say that the 
development of the EC/EUʼs exports was of weak sustainable kind at best. 
The relatively highest increases over the period in question for absolute exports and their 
ecological rucksacks were recorded by forestry and fi shing products (the latter also for 
imports).
Trade Balance by Product Group
When we look at the trade balance by product group (imports minus exports), it becomes 
clear that the EC/EUʼs net balance (DMI) between 1976 and 2000 was due to fossil fuels 
and to metals and metal products (Table 5). Their increase over this period also crucially 
contributed to the total increase in net purchases. Both of these product groups also deter-
mined the overall net pressure on resources (TMR) and its increase from 1976 to 2000.
Imports by Region of Origin and Upward Tendency
Complementing the general picture, we shall consider in this section, which EC/EU 
imports from developing countries outside Europe and from European NICs are espe-
cially important because of above-average growth in absolute quantities. 
Table 5: Physical trade balance of EU 2000.
DMI 2000
(million
tonnes)
DMI:
change
compared
to 1976
TMR 2000
(million
tonnes)
TMR:
change
compared
to 1976
Biomasses from agriculture 25,4 -61% 245,7 -57%
Biomasses from forestry 40,3 8% 107,7 8%
Biomasses from fishing/hunting 2,0 268% 2,6 270%
Fossil fuels 704,1 30% 1821,5 106%
Metals and metal products 146,1 30% 3829,1 194%
Minerals and mineral products 22,7 121% 254,1 221%
Other products 65,8 -1.141% 65,8 -1.141%
Total 1006,4 32% 6259,2 114%
Renewable materials 67,7 -35% 356,0 -47%
Non-Renewable materials 872,9 32% 5904,8 161%
Physical trade balance
Source: Eurostat Comext 2001 and Wuppertal Institute data base.
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In general, imports from developing countries outside Europe remained at a high level 
from 1976 to 2000 (although their share of such imports fell considerably from around 
60% in 1976 to around 40% in 2000). The following product groups from developing 
countries outside Europe did increase their imports into the EC/EU at quite a fast rate: 
stoneware, furniture, synthetic materials and track vehicles (Fig. 19). Altogether, how-
ever, these groups accounted for no more than 1% of the EC/EUʼs total imports from 
developing countries in the year 2000, although the trend has been upward (a factor of 
100 compared with 1976). The main imports to have declined in signifi cance are: furs, 
wool, cereal products and vegetable textiles from developing countries outside Europe 
– that is, mainly products from primary sectors and base material industries. The increase 
in products such as track vehicles, synthetic materials and furniture, in particular, indi-
cates that in developing countries too there has been a shift towards higher-value export 
goods. Future studies will have to investigate which particular products and countries 
are involved, how constant and profound this trend is, and what ecological-social conse-
quences are bound up with it.
All in all, imports from European NICs increased by 226% between 1976 and 2000 (Fig. 
20). The extent to which production for internal needs was relocated outside the EU 
could only be determined from a comparative temporal analysis of internal production 
and imports, but at present that is not feasible for production. The absolutely increasing 
quantities of imports already indicate at least some degree of relocation, however, as 
well as increased pressure on the environment associated with the imports. Fast-growing 
imports to the EC/EU from European NICs should be noted for: soaps etc., track vehi-
cles, ethereal oils and aircraft. Nevertheless, as with developing countries, these groups 
together accounted for no more than 0.2% of the EC/EUʼs total imports from NICs in the 
Figure 19: Rising import trends of product groups from
developing countries outside Europe to the EC/EU: 1976–2000.
Source: Eurostat Comext 2001.
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year 2000, though with an upward trend (a factor of 20 in comparison with 1976). The 
main groups to decline in importance were: corkware, silk, natural resins and varnishes, 
animal and vegetable fats and oils, and ores – basically the same result as in the case of 
developing countries outside Europe.
Traded Goods That Were Not Produced At All Internally, 
Or Only on a Small Scale
Here we shall investigate the signifi cance of EC/EU imports that cannot be produced at all 
internally, or only on a small scale. These products are not present at all, or present only 
on a small scale, in the natural production area of the EC/EU. For them to be replaced 
with internal products at given levels of demand, there would have to be major efforts to 
develop supply, production and consumption technologies. In this connection, we shall 
consider only materials such as coffee, cocoa beans, cotton, all ores, fossil fuels (where 
imports account for roughly half) and rare minerals. Because of natural conditions in the 
EC/EU, these materials are available there only in limited quantities if at all. To a consid-
erable extent, alternative technologies can substitute for them in the medium to long term 
– including through the use of alternative materials (especially renewable raw materials 
and energy sources but also more effi cient technologies). Dependence on imports of such 
materials may therefore only be assumed on the basis of existing technologies. For the 
sake of simplicity, we shall designate such goods here as trade goods. 
In the year 2000, the EC/EU imported 892 million tonnes of trade goods, 28% more than 
in 1976 (Fig. 21). This amounted to 85% of all imports of raw materials – a percent-
Figure 20: Rising import trends of product groups from European NICs
to the EC/EU: 1976–2000.
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age that remained fairly constant between 1976 and 2000. The EC/EUʼs imports of raw 
materials therefore mostly served to cover current demand with resources that were not 
available internally. 
The bulk of these trade goods came from developing countries (74-46%, with clearly 
downward trends in both percentage terms and absolute quantities), and 14-32% from 
OECD countries (with a tendency to fl uctuate). Increasingly signifi cant were imports of 
trade goods from European NICs, which raised their share from 9% in 1976 to 17% in 
2000. Severely indebted countries (SICs) supplied large and fairly constant quantities 
of trade goods to the EC/EU (around 20%). Thus, European NICs – together with SICs 
– increasingly serve as suppliers of raw materials to the European economy that are una-
vailable to it internally, or available only on a small scale. By contrast, low income coun-
tries (LICs), highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and sub-Saharan Africa accounted 
for considerably smaller shares in 2000 (3-11%), with a tendency to decline since 1976.
An Overview of the Role of Developing and Newly Industrializing Countries
Some results of this study point to change in the roles of developing and newly industri-
alizing countries as sources of EC/EU material input. Fig. 22 gives an overview of this 
in relation to the main components: imports of raw materials, semi-manufactured and 
fi nished goods (together forming the DMI of imports) and their respective ecological 
rucksacks. 
Whereas DMI imports for developing countries remained fairly constant between 1976 
and 2000, they signifi cantly increased for NICs both within and outside Europe, in each 
case reaching roughly half the level for developing countries in 2000. These increases 
should be attributed primarily to imports of raw materials. Imports of semi-manufactured 
and fi nished goods increased slightly in all three regions, but remained at a considerably 
lower level than those of raw materials. Developing countries as a whole stagnated as far 
as their direct material input to the EC/EU was concerned, whereas newly industrializing 
countries increasingly assumed the role of supplying raw materials. In all three regions 
no clear general shift was discernible into more highly processed exports (only a partial 
shift, as previously described). 
As we have already explained, in contrast to direct imports of raw materials from devel-
oping countries, their ecological rucksack increases disproportionately and leads overall 
to a considerable rise in the total resource requirement for exports to the EC/EU. This is 
less clear for the ecological rucksacks of semi-manufactured and fi nished goods, which 
are subject to great fl uctuation. The same picture holds for newly industrializing countries 
outside Europe. 
Things look different for Europeʼs newly industrializing countries: here the total resource 
intensity of raw material exports to the EC/EU increases less sharply. Instead, the ecologi-
cal rucksacks increase disproportionately for exports of semi-manufactured and fi nished 
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goods, and in the 1990s they dominated the total resource requirement for exports to 
the EC/EU. Exports of this kind were thus increasingly based upon resource-intensive 
production or semi-processed goods in Europeʼs newly industrializing countries. This 
underlines the conclusion with regard to the rise in EC/EU imports of pollution inten-
sive goods from Europeʼs newly industrializing countries. One suspects that the com-
paratively “rich” countries of the EU have increasingly relocated pollution intensive and 
resource-intensive production to the transformation economies of Eastern Europe. As we 
said before, this point would have to be confi rmed through analysis of the relevant pro-
duction within the EU. But that is not presently feasible because the necessary data are 
either missing or incomplete. 
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4 Summary Discussion
Pressure on the Environment: Its Extent and Its Relocation
Growing pressure on the environment in the wake of economic globalisation has been 
investigated by means of world data and an analysis of material fl ows in the EC/EU econ-
omy as a whole.   Global pressures on the environment, in the form of energy consumption 
and CO
2
 emissions, did not increase worldwide during the last two decades of the  twentieth 
century in proportion to the monetary trade volume as a measure of globalisation.
Consumption of primary energy and primary materials in Germany and the EU (and in 
the UK), seen as representative of industrial countries, has tended to stabilize or actu-
ally stabilized. Resource consumption by these economies has been relatively de-coupled 
from economic growth, and therefore also from monetary trade volume. But an absolute 
reduction in resource consumption has not yet been achieved in the EU. Moreover, non-
renewable resources have remained dominant, so that it is still far from possible to speak 
of sustainable development. 
The absolute quantities of trade fl ows, and of the associated total material requirement 
(TMR) including the ecological rucksacks of imports and exports, have risen in the wake 
of globalisation, as has the quantity of emissions involved in the EUʼs pollution intensive 
trade fl ows. Pressures on the environment associated with internationally traded goods 
have, thus, also increased. It cannot be concluded, however, that the global sum of pres-
sures on the environment related to resources and emissions has increased. 
Pressures on the environment have thus been relocated between regions of the world 
economy:
• on the production side, the share of imported resources in the total material require-
ment of EU industrial countries has increased (Figs. 9, 12 and 16);
• developing countries outside Europe serve as constant suppliers of raw materials 
(Figs. 10, 12 and 22); recent trends point to possible advances towards greater value-
creating industries;
• newly industrializing countries within and outside Europe are increasingly assuming 
the role of suppliers of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods to the rich coun-
tries of the EU (Fig. 22).
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Development of Unequal Ecological Exchange
Unequal ecological exchange has been defi ned here as unequal weighting in relation to:
• The PTB including ecological rucksacks: an import surplus here means that the total 
pressure on resources is greater than the domestic pressure associated to exports, i.e., 
that there is additional pressure on the environment in other countries.
In principle the same is true for the PTB of pollution intensive products, with regard to 
production-side pressures in the shape of emissions and waste. Here, however, it is nec-
essary to make a differentiated analysis of the characteristics and distribution of these 
pressures on the environment. First, we might reckon up the PTB separately for each 
individual group and product of pollution intensive products, then, for example, deepen 
this with analysis of particular regional pressures on the environment resulting from pro-
duction technologies, in order to assess possible effects of additional or reduced pressure 
in comparison with the status quo ante.
The EU as a whole, as well as Germany and other industrial countries, import physically 
more goods than they export. Unequal ecological exchange between rich industrial coun-
tries and the rest of the world manifests itself primarily in physical trade quantities and 
their resulting ecological rucksacks. It testifi es to greater pressure on resources through 
domestic activity abroad than through exports to the rest of the world. The United King-
dom occupies a special position in this respect among rich industrial countries. Its physi-
cal trade balances are partly even. To some extent, the UK acquires abroad less environ-
ment-straining goods than it produces itself for transfers to other economies. 
 Unequal ecological exchange between industrial countries and newly industrializing or 
developing countries qualifi es the assertion that developed economies have successfully 
reduced their pressures on the environment. 
The EC/EUʼs foreign trade asymmetry has intensifi ed in the wake of globalisation. Its 
claim on resources through foreign trade (net imports) has increased. At the same time, 
internal pressure on the environment through resource extraction has diminished, with 
the result that total material consumption (TMC) has remained constant. This means that 
pressures on the environment attributable to the EU have remained at the same level, but 
have been geographically relocated.
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On the Factors Driving the Global Consumption of Resources and 
Its Spatial Distribution
The consumption of resources in the EU has reached a constant level. Thus, what appears 
to be decisive for the sharply increasing trade fl ows is no longer internal demand but 
demand in other economic areas (USA, developing countries and newly industrializing 
countries). Exports are not only the motor of the economy but also the drive belt for the 
input of resources into the EU. 
This means that, in the medium to long term, development in newly industrializing and 
developing countries will determine the dynamic of global resource consumption. 
Further de-coupling of global resource consumption from world economic growth can 
therefore take place only in so far as exports from industrial countries to developing or 
newly industrializing countries (a) are produced by themselves with a more effi cient use 
of resources, and (b) involve the least possible resource requirement. This means that 
international environmental and economic policy is increasingly called upon to assist 
with sustainable cross-sector resource management in these countries. In this context, 
it needs to be investigated what positive infl uence may be exercised by internationally 
active corporations. 
If unequal ecological exchange in relation to international pressures on the environment is 
to be reduced, then it is above all necessary to lessen the resource requirement in produc-
tion (that is, imports of primary raw materials and associated semi-manufactured goods) 
in the industrial countries. Thus, greater resource productivity in the industrial countries, 
together with an absolute reduction in resource consumption, has a multiple strategic 
signifi cance for the sustainability of an increasingly global world economy. The meas-
urement of resource productivity must take these imported quantities into account. This 
applies especially to the offi cial reporting instruments (e.g., National Statistical Offi ces 
and Environment Agencies, or the EUʼs Eurostat).
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Further Work
The following questions suggest themselves for further work:
• Which geostrategically signifi cant resources contribute especially to the relocation 
of environmental problems through the economy of the EU (see the examples of tan-
talum and platinum in the text)? Which regional/global problems of availability or 
scarcity should be expected to arise? Which technologies are mainly associated with 
them? What are the possibilities of reducing such elements of dependence? 
• Which economic, ecological and social effects arise from the increasing stain on 
resources in developing and newly industrializing countries (e.g., with regard to the 
exploitation of precious metals)? Which possibilities exist there on which to build 
sustainable resource management? How can international organizations and various 
players in industrial countries help in this process? 
• Which instruments and measures should the EU and its member-states develop to 
boost their resource productivity, thereby reducing the global consumption of non-
renewable resources and the international disparities in resource use? What role is 
played in this by economic and fi nancial policy, and by technological or institutional 
innovation? Which instruments are also suitable for developing and newly industrial-
izing countries? 
• What resource consumption targets and what kind of ecologically equalized trade bal-
ance can be deduced for industrial countries such as Germany and the EU? What does 
this imply for a strategy to increase resource productivity?
In general, more attention should be paid to how an increase in resource productivity, and 
especially a dematerialization of industrial countries, is likely to affect developing and 
newly industrializing countries. 
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5 Methodology and Data
This study is largely based on offi cial trade (imports plus exports) statistics for the EC/
EU, which are published annually by the Statistical Offi ce of the European Commission: 
EUROSTAT (Comext data base on CD-Rom). Their quality may be described as very 
good. This is also true, of course, of the global (monetary) foreign trade data of the WTO. 
Data on GDP, energy consumption and CO
2
 emissions should in general be considered to 
be of a similiarly high quality. 
The methodology for data generation, as well as for the deduction of total resource 
requirement and consumption in national economies, has been offi cially laid down in 
texts such as EUROSTATʼs Methodological Guide for Economy-Wide Material Flow 
Accounts and Derived Indicators (2001b). Offi cial statistics have adopted TMR, and 
hence the methodology for the determination of ecological rucksacks and TMC, as an 
indicator of total resource requirements: in the United Kingdom (www.statistics.gov.uk), 
Bringezu and Schütz 2001c), Poland (Central Statistical Offi ce Poland 1999), Denmark 
(Pedersen 2002), Finland (Muukkonen 2000), Italy (Barbiero et al. 2003) and EURO-
STAT (Bringezu and Schütz 2001b). TMR has also been adopted in the USA, Japan and 
a number of other countries (for an overview see Bringezu et al. 2003). 
The quantitative presentation of pollution intensive goods is based on a World Bank study 
(Mani/Wheeler 1997). Ten product groups from the most intensive sectors are singled out: 
iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals (industrial and other), mineral fuels, non-
metallic mineral products, cellulose and paper, rubber goods, leather goods and metal 
goods. The data therefore do not distinguish between raw materials and semifi nished or 
fi nished goods. The classifi cation is based on polluting emissions into the atmosphere and 
water, as well as heavy metal emissions. In addition, a distinction is made between pol-
lution intensive goods with mineral fuels and without mineral fuels: the latter are in the 
main those which directly pollute the environment in producing or exporting countries 
through emissions and waste; whereas the former pollute the global environment mainly 
through atmospheric emissions resulting from combustion in the consuming or importing 
economies. 
The long time series for imports and exports (1976 to 2000) corresponds to the member-
state structure of the EC or EU-15 for the respective periods. This is unavoidable, because 
EUROSTATʼs foreign trade statistics provide no other data. Aggregate import and export 
trends, both monetary and physical, show that the incorporation of new countries during 
the 1976-1995 period did not have any noteworthy effect on the scale or course of EC or 
EU foreign trade. This is confi rmed by other assessments of total physical imports and 
exports that extend the data for the EC to the area of the EU-15 (Bringezu and Schütz 
2001b, Eurostat 2002). These are used above in our analysis of the relocation of resource 
extraction with the inclusion of ecological rucksacks, as well as in our account of trends 
in total resource requirement and consumption.  
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The classifi cation of countries by income and level of debt has been taken from the World 
Bank, as has that of the HIPCs. Developing countries are defi ned by consideration of 
lists of the UN (Human Development Report), the World Bank and the OECD. Least 
developed countries (LDCs) as well as amalgamations of countries such as the OECD 
are classifi ed in accordance with the systems used by the UN (COMTRADE) and the 
WTO (Trade Statistics). Newly industrializing countries (Schwellenländer) are identifi ed 
in accordance with data of the German “Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung” and the 
Börsenlexikon. The grouping by geographical regions corresponds to WTO Trade Statis-
tics.
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